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This paper examines the effect of the number of visits by U.S. officials to a country, 
and the number of visits of the country’s leaders to the United States, on bilateral trade flows 
between the country and the United States. To achieve our objective, we compile novel 
variables that indicate the number of official visits from 1960-2015 from the historical 
archives of the U.S. State Department. To deal with potential endogeneity, we use 
instrumental variables panel data techniques such as dynamic GMM and systems GMM 
estimations. The estimation results show that the visits by U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of 
State do not have a statistically significant effect on bilateral trade flows, while the leader’s 
trips to the United States have a statistically significant positive effect. This indicates that the 
leader’s trips to the United States are taken as an opportunity to promote free bilateral trade 
flows between the country and the United States, while the visits of American officials focus 
on other issues. 
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This paper examines the effect of the official visits by U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of 
State to a country, and the visits by a country’s leaders to the United States, on the level of 
bilateral trade flows between the country and the United States. To be specific, we investigate 
whether the visits by either American leaders to a country, or by the leaders of the country to 
the United States, allow the country to be able to increase its trade flows with the United 
States out of its trade with the entire world.  
The intuition of this paper is straightforward. Leaders and heads of state travel abroad 
for a plethora of purposes. One of the most important reasons is to strengthen bilateral 
economic ties between their country and the countries they are visiting. These economic ties 
can be fostered by increasing trade and commercial exchange, attracting foreign capital 
inflows, securing foreign loans and foreign aid, containing any potential disputes or border 
conflicts, and facilitating travel and cultural exchange between the citizens of the two 
countries. In the context of this paper, these visits allow the visitors to convene with the 
officials of their trading partner to conclude trade agreements, to determine how commercial 
exchange can satisfy the demands of their consumers, to contain trade disputes, and to discuss 
the elimination of trade barriers. Foreign officials can take the trip of the head of the state as a 
strong signal from the highest levels of a country's leadership for their serious commitment to 
facilitate free trade flows without barriers. Thus, we would expect that the number of official 
visits to be positively associated with bilateral trade flows. 
Frequent visits to the United States also allow the leaders to interact with American 
political and economic influential figures. The direct interaction and interpersonal contact 
with these figures allow the leaders to cultivate close ties that they can depend on after 
returning to their home countries. Leaders can, thus, use their influential connections and 
3 
 
close contacts in the United States to lobby for the conclusion of trade agreements or for the 
elimination of trade barriers. This can lead the leader’s trips to increase bilateral trade flows.  
Given this intuition, we examine empirically the effect of the number of leaders’ visits 
on bilateral trade flows. To achieve this objective, the paper uses novel variables that indicate 
the number of visits by U.S. Presidents to the country, the number of visits by U.S. 
Secretaries of State to the country, and the number of visits by the leader of the country to the 
United States of America. These variables are derived from the historical archives of the U.S. 
Department of State. The paper examines the effect of these variables on the value of trade 
with the United States as a fraction of the value of trade with the entire world. It is worth 
noting that we compiled this trade variable for each country and each year during the period 
of analysis from the UNCOMTRADE database. 
The Fixed Effects estimation shows that the leader’s trips to the United States have a 
statistically significant positive effect, while the visits of American officials to the country do 
not have a significant effect. The robustness test shows that this is the case in particular during 
the cold war era. However, the key difficulty in determining a causal effect of the number of 
official visits on bilateral trade flows is the issue of endogeneity. First, the association may be 
spurious due to a failure to account for an unobserved channel that may determine both 
variables. Second, as much as trade flows can increase after the visits of the American 
officials to the country or the visits of the leaders of the country to the United States, leaders 
may be tempted to visit their major trading partners as well. This is either to ensure the 
smooth flow of trade, to increase the volume and value of trade, or to contain any trade 
disputes. This highlights an issue of reverse causality.  
To deal with potential endogeneity, we use instrumental variable techniques for panel 
data such as the Arellano and Bond (199) Generalized Method of Moments estimation, and 
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the Blundell and Bond (1998) systems GMM estimation. The results confirm our previous 
findings that only the leader’s trips to the United States have a statistically significant positive 
association with bilateral trade flows. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the literature 
survey, section 3 includes the detailed description of the data, section 4 includes the empirical 
estimation results and the robustness tests, and section 5 concludes. References, tables and 
figures are included thereafter. 
2. Literature 
This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of trade flows. There is a 
new burgeoning literature that specifically focuses on the effect of bilateral political relations, 
the effect of the similarity of the political systems of governance and political institutions, the 
effects of political tensions and armed conflict, and the effects of foreign political 
interference, on bilateral trade flows.  
The first stream of studies focuses on the effect of political relationships and diplomatic 
ties between trading partners on their bilateral trade flows. For instance, Nitsch (2007) 
examine the effect of state visits of the heads of state of France, Germany and the United 
States on exports. The author finds that state and official visits are positively associated with 
bilateral exports, and that the effect is strong but short‐lived. Lin et al. (2017) show that state 
visits by African leaders to China increase Chinese exports to Africa in capital intensive 
manufacturing goods, and significantly stimulate exports by state‐owned enterprises to 
African countries.  
Nitsch (2019) examine the effect of the ease with which a country's citizens can enter 
foreign countries on the extent of bilateral trade, and finds that countries which issue powerful 
passports experience more international trade. Rose (2007) examine whether exports are 
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associated with diplomatic representation abroad. The author finds that bilateral exports 
increase for each additional consulate abroad, and that the creation of consulates has smaller 
effects than the creation of an embassy. Creusen and Lejour (2013) examine the role of 
economic diplomacy on the export market entry decisions of Dutch firms. The authors show 
that the presence of government support offices and trade missions entice Dutch firms to enter 
export markets in these countries. Pollins (1989) build a model of bilateral trade flows 
employing international conflict and cooperation to predict the level of imports. The author 
finds empirical support to the model prediction that the effects of diplomacy on trade and 
commerce are significant. Head and Ries (2010) examine the effect of sending trade missions 
by Canada in stimulating trade. The authors find that above-normal Canadian exports and 
imports are with countries to which it sent trade missions. However, trade missions have 
small and insignificant effect on trade. 
Some studies explore the effect of political and diplomatic tensions, and armed conflict, 
on trade flows. For instance, Fuchs and Klann (2013) investigate whether countries that 
welcome the Dalai Lama, despite China’s opposition, experience a significant decrease in 
their exports to China. Their results show that countries receiving the Dalai Lama at the 
highest political level are punished through a decline in their exports to China, but the effect 
disappears in the second year after a meeting took place. 
Davis and Meunier (2011) show that political tensions do not affect trade or economic 
exchange for the United States or Japan, as the sunk costs in existing trade and investment 
make governments, firms, and consumers unlikely to change their behavior due to any 
deterioration in political ties. Michaels and Zhi (2010) examine the deterioration of relations 
between the United States and France from 2002-2003, when France's favorability rating in 
the United States dropped significantly. The authors estimate that the changing attitudes 
adversely affected bilateral trade. 
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Glick and Taylor (2010) examine whether conflict between countries and warfare can 
be disruptive of economic activity, especially bilateral trade. The authors find large persistent 
effects of wars on trade, national income, and global economic welfare. Nitsch and 
Schumacher (2004) examine the effect of terrorism and warfare on bilateral trade flows, and 
find evidence that terrorist actions decrease the volume of trade. 
Other studies explore the effect of the political systems and institutions on trade flows. 
For instance, Aidt and Gassebner (2010) examine whether the political regime of a country 
influence its involvement in international trade. The authors find that autocracies import 
substantially less than democracies even after controlling for official trade policies. Mansfield 
et al. (2014) explore whether countries' political institutions affect their international trade 
relations and trade policy. Their results show that pairs of democracies set trade barriers at a 
lower level than mixed country-pairs (composed of an autocracy and a democracy), and that 
democratic pairs have much more open trade relations than mixed pairs. 
Morrow et al. (2014) examine whether trade flows are larger between states with similar 
interests, between allies, and in democratic dyads than nondemocratic dyads. Their analysis 
demonstrates that joint democracy and common interests increase trade in a dyad, but 
alliances do not. Kono (2006) finds that democracy leads to lower tariffs, but higher core and 
quality nontariff barriers. The author concludes that democracy promotes "optimal 
obfuscation" that allows politicians to protect their markets while maintaining a veneer of 
liberalization. Acemoglu and Yared (2010) document that countries experiencing greater 
increases in militarist sentiments have had lower growth in trade, and that a pair of countries 
jointly experiencing greater increases in militarism has lower growth in bilateral trade. 
Finally, some studies focus on foreign interference on trade flows. For instance, Berger 
et al. (2013) provide evidence that CIA interventions during the Cold War were used to create 
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a larger foreign market for American products. Following CIA interventions, imports from the 
US increased dramatically, while total exports to the US were unaffected, and that the 
increased imports arose through direct purchases of American products by foreign 
governments. 
Our paper’s contribution to the literature is that it is the first attempt to explore and 
compare between the effects of different types of leaders’ visits on bilateral trade. There are 
few studies in the literature that examine the effect of official visits on trade flows, however 
our study is the first to compare the effects of the visits of the leaders of the country to its 
trading partner, and the effects of the visits of the leaders of its trading partner to the country. 
In the context of this paper, we are comparing the effects of the visits of American officials to 
the country against the visits of the officials of the country to the United States in order to be 
able to determine which is more critical in determining bilateral trade flows. 
3. Data 
The countries included in the analysis are Taiwan, Canada, Liberia, Rwanda, Thailand, 
Czech Republic, Niger, Belize, USA, Guyana, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Costa Rica,  
Malta, Ethiopia, Lao PDR, Libya, China, Turkey, Mongolia, Latvia, Guatemala, Uruguay, 
Republic of Moldova, Tajikistan, Saudi Arabia, Greece, Burundi, Tanzania, Portugal, Malawi, 
Netherlands, Antigua and Barbuda, Macao, Gabon, Nigeria, Cuba, Swaziland, Tunisia, 
Bermuda, Mozambique, Oman, Bhutan, Nepal, Georgia, Angola, Armenia, Mali, Denmark, 
Burkina Faso, Papua New Guinea, Venezuela, Uganda, Comoros, Syria, Lebanon, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Equatorial Guinea, Pakistan, Brunei, Kuwait, Algeria, Congo, Bangladesh, 
Mauritius, Eritrea, Honduras, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Haiti, Suriname, Benin, 
Germany, Norway, Lesotho, Central African Republic, Bahamas, Azerbaijan, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Singapore, Yemen, Fiji, Korea, Timor-Leste, Colombia, Albania, Djibouti,  
Nicaragua, Belarus, Jamaica, Madagascar, Brazil, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ireland, 
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Iran, France, Egypt, Turkmenistan, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Peru, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, 
New Zealand, Bahrain, Gambia, Zambia, El Salvador, Ukraine, Spain, Croatia, Iraq, Grenada, 
Jordan, Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Hong Kong, Russia, Belgium, Micronesia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Iceland, Dominica, Qatar, Luxembourg, Slovak Republic, Indonesia, Macedonia, Austria, 
Lithuania, Chad, Afghanistan, Slovenia, Tonga, Cameroon, Chile, Poland, Cyprus, Argentina, 
Singapore, Romania, Sudan, Israel, Philippines, Ecuador, Barbados, Panama, Palau, Somalia, 
Seychelles, St. Lucia, Finland, Estonia, Cape Verde,  Paraguay, Vanuatu, United Kingdom, 
Australia, Italy, Montenegro, Kazakhstan, Cambodia, Kiribati, Guatemala, Guinea, Japan. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis.  
The dependent variable in our analysis is the value of trade (in U.S. $) with the United 
States divided by the value of trade (in U.S. $) with the world for each country. This variable 
is compiled from the UNCOMTRADE dataset from 1960-2015. We calculated the value of 
trade (exports+imports) of each country with the United States, and the value of trade 
(exports+imports) of each country with the World. Then, we use the ratio of the two variables 
as our dependent variable.    
The variables of interest are the number of visits by U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of 
State to the country, and the number of visits by the country’s leaders to the United States of 
America during the period 1960-2015. These include state visits, official working visits, 
summits, private visits, informal visits, meetings, and working visits. This data is derived 
from the Office of the Historian, which is affiliated to the Department of Sate of the United 
States of America.1 Figures 1-3 show world maps of the number of visits of U.S. Presidents to 
each country, the number of visits of U.S. Secretaries of State to each country, and the 
number of each country’s leader’s trips to the United States, respectively.  




We include some control variables that are identified by the literature as determinants of 
foreign trade. We include the level of development measured by logarithm of Gross Domestic 
Product per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) which is derived from the World 
Development Indicators. Countries with a higher level of economic development are expected 
to be more involved in trade and commercial exchange to be able to continue enjoying higher 
levels of living standards. We also include an indicator of the size of the country which is the 
logarithm of population. The size of the country determines whether the country needs to 
trade with other nations or whether domestic markets are sufficient. 
We use the Polity score which is extracted from the Polity IV Project. The Polity score 
captures a country's political regime on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) 
to +10 (strongly democratic). The paper uses the Polity2 variable which is a modified version 
of the Polity variable by applying a simple treatment to convert instances of "standardized 
authority scores" (-66,-77,-88) to conventional polity scores within the range -10 to +10.  
Some studies, as stated in the literature, find that democratic countries trade more than 
autocratic ones. We also include a dummy if the country was not colonized, or was a British, 
French, or Spanish colony. The argument is that colonies have the tendency to trade more 
with their colonizer compared to other countries. 
We include an indicator that reflects the abundance and dependence on natural 
resources. We use the natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP from the World 
Development Indicators. The argument is that countries abundant in natural wealth will have 
less trade in other products as an effect of the Dutch Disease. 
We also use a cultural variable that indicates whether the country shares the same 
language as the United States. This is a dummy variable equals to1 if the country’s language 
is English, and zero otherwise. Some studies argued that cultural proximity have significant 
effects on bilateral trade and economic exchange such as in Guiso et al. (2009). 
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We include a dummy equals to 1 if the country has a common border with the United 
States, and a dummy equals to 1 if the country is landlocked. Countries that have common 
borders with the United States have lower transportation costs and accordingly more trade 
with the United States. Countries that are landlocked are disadvantaged, as they are likely to 
trade less with other countries including the United States. We also include a dummy equals 
to 1 if the country has a free trade agreement with the United States2. Countries that signed 
trade agreements with the United States are more likely to engage in more bilateral trade 
flows with the United States.  
The gravity model of international trade predicts bilateral trade flows based on the size 
and distance between two countries. Thus, we include capital distance, which is the distance 
in kilometers from Washington D.C. to the official place of the leader’s residence in every 
country around the world. We use different sources for the distance calculations3 to ensure 
robustness, reliability, and to check the conformity of the observations. The inclusion of this 
variable is based on the intuition that there will be more bilateral trade with countries whose 
capital cities are closer to that of the United States. The close distance between the country 
and the United States reflects lower transportation costs and thus a higher level of bilateral 
trade and commercial exchange.  
4. Estimation  
4.1 Baseline Results 
In this section, we conduct an empirical estimation of the effect of the number of 
official visits by the U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of State to the country, and the number of 
visits by the country’s leader to the United States, on bilateral trade flows with the United 
States during the period 1960-2015. Figure 4 shows the relationship between the number of 
official visits and bilateral trade with the United States. To estimate these relationships 
                                                             
2 https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements 




empirically, we use the following gravity model equation as suggested by Head and Mayer 
(2014) and as is the current standard in the empirical international trade literature 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃 + 𝛿𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ℵ𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜎𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (1) 
Where Tradeit is the value of trade with United States divided by the value of trade with 
the World for country I in year t. OfficialVisitsit is the number of visits by U.S. Presidents or 
Secretaries of State to country i in year t, or the number of visits of country i’s leader to the 
United States in year t. ℵit is a vector of control variables in country i in year t. The vector of 
control variables includes those commonly identified in the literature as determinants of 
institutions. The 𝜇𝑖 denotes a full set of country dummies, the 𝜎𝑡 denotes a full set of time 
effects that capture common shocks to institutions of all countries, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is an error term 
capturing all other omitted factors, with E(𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 0 for all i and t. We use panel data 
techniques as recommended by Yotov et al. (2016). 
The results of the Fixed Effects OLS estimated with robust standard errors clustered by 
country are included in table 2. In column 1, the variable of interest is the number of visits of 
U.S. Presidents. In column 2, the variable of interest is the number of visits of U.S. 
Secretaries of State. In column 3, the variable of interest is the number of leader’s trips to the 
United States. The results show that the visits by U.S. officials to the country do not have a 
statistically significant effect on the trade variable. On the other hand, the leader’s trips to the 
United States have a statistically significant positive effect. These results imply that the visits 
by U.S. officials to the country are focused on issues other than the promotion of bilateral 
trade, while the trips by the country’s leaders to the United States are used as an opportunity 
to strengthen bilateral ties through commercial exchange.  
The results also show that the logarithm of population and capital distance have a 
statistically significant negative effect, while the dummy variables for common borders and 




4.2. Before and After the End of the Cold War 
We check the robustness of our baseline results by examining the effect of official 
visits before and after the end of the Cold war. This is because the confrontational climate 
during the cold war caused countries around the world to attempt to cope with a highly 
antagonistic environment, and to survive in a global arena squeezed between the conflicting 
interests of the two super powers. This implies that high level visits to the United States 
during the cold war likely focused on dealing with the geopolitical developments of the time. 
The results are included in table 3 and show that the visits by U.S. officials to the country, and 
the visits of the country’s leaders to the United States, do not have a statistically significant 
effect on the trade variable after the end of the Cold war. On the other hand, the leader’s trips 
to the United States have a statistically significant positive effect during the Cold war era. 
4.3 Additional Control Variables 
 To further check the robustness of our results, we include additional control variables. 
In this context, we control for relative factor endowments, calculated as the absolute 
difference between the incomes per capita of the two trading partners. The inclusion of this 
variable is consistent with Paudel and Cooray (2018) and Cooray et al. (2020). The positive 
(negative) coefficient on relative factor endowments implies that countries with different 
endowments will trade more (less) with each other. A positive coefficient on relative factor 
endowments supports the Heckscher–Ohlin theory and a negative coefficient on relative 
factor endowment supports the Linder hypothesis. We also include the income per capita 
growth rates to explore whether increased trade is driven by higher growth rates. The results 
with the inclusion of the additional control variables are included in table 4. The results 
confirm our previous finding that only the leader’s trips to the United States is positively 
associated with bilateral trade flows. 
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4.4 Alternatives Techniques 
The econometric analysis, however, may suffer from a selection bias if the dependent 
variable is restricted to positive trade flows. Therefore, valuable insights from zero trade 
flows may be lost. We follow Helpman et al. (2008) and Silva and Tenreyo (2006) in using 
alternative econometric techniques to address this issue. First, we use Tobit econometric 
model which is used when the observed range of the dependent variable is censored from 
below at zero. The results in table 5 show that the official visits have no statistically 
significant effect on bilateral trade flows. 
We also use the Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PML) estimator as suggested by 
Yotov et al. (2016). The PML estimation is a method of estimating the parameters of a 
Poisson probability distribution by maximizing a likelihood function, so that under the 
assumed statistical model the observed data is most probable. The results in table 5 show that 
none of the official visits variables have a statistically significant effect. 
Finally, we use the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator as 
proposed by Silva and Tenreyo (2006) who criticized the conventional practices of the log-
linearized gravity trade models and proposed an alternative to deal with the issue of 
heteroscedasticity and the zero trade values. In this context, the authors argue that the gravity 
equation should be estimated using a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood estimation 
technique which is considered a special case of the Generalized Nonlinear Linear Model 
(GNLM) framework in which the variance is assumed proportional to the mean. The authors 
show that this method is robust to different patterns of heteroscedasticity and resolves the 
inefficiency problem. Due to the improvements this approach has introduced to gravity 
models, it became common practice in the international trade literature. The results of the 
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PPML are included in table 5 and show that none of the visits variables have a significant 
effect. 
4.5. Endogeneity 
The Fixed Effects OLS estimation assumes that the official visits are exogenous to 
bilateral trade flows. However, the problem of endogeneity cannot be ignored. First, the 
association may be spurious due to the failure to account for an unobserved factor which 
could be affecting both trade flows and official visits. Second, as much as trade flows can 
increase after the visits of the American officials to the country or after the visits of the 
leaders of the country to the United States, these leaders may be tempted to visit their major 
trading partners as well. This is either to ensure the smooth flow of trade, to synchronize their 
trade policies, to increase the volume and value of trade, or to contain any trade disputes. This 
highlights an issue of reverse causality. In addition, the previous analysis does not consider 
the possibility of persistence in trade. It is possible that a high level of bilateral trade in one 
period of time leads to higher trade flows in subsequent periods. Therefore, we estimate the 
following equation 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃 + 𝛿𝑖𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜎𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + ℵ𝑖𝑡−1𝛾 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜎𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (3) 
The standard techniques that can be employed for panel estimation, such as fixed effects 
and random effects, cannot be used in this case. The problem with these techniques is that the 
equation contains a lagged endogenous variable, which is the lagged value of bilateral trade 
flows. In this case, estimation by fixed effects and random effects is not consistent. In 
addition, we also have the problem of endogeneity of leader’s trips. To deal with potential 
endogeneity and the lagged dependent variable, we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
estimation technique. This GMM estimator first-differences each variable so as to eliminate 
the country specific effect and then uses all possible lagged values of each of the variables as 
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instruments. This not only corrects for the bias introduced by the lagged endogenous variable 
but also allows for a certain degree of endogeneity in the other explanatory variables.  
The results of the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimation technique are included in table 
6. The results also confirm our previous findings that only the visits of the country’s leader to 
the United States have a statistically significant positive effect on bilateral trade flows. In 
addition, trade flows show a high level of persistence given the statistically significant 
positive coefficient of trade flows. 
When the variance of the individual effect term across individual observations is high, 
then the Arellano–Bond (1991) estimator may perform poorly in finite samples. Blundell and 
Bond (1998) derive a condition under which it is possible to use an additional set of moment 
conditions. These additional moment conditions can be used to improve the small sample 
performance of the Arellano–Bond (1991) estimator. This method is referred to as systems 
GMM. The results of the system GMM are included in table 7. The results confirm our 
previous findings that the leader’s trips to the United States are what matters for bilateral trade 
flows. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the effect of the number of visits by U.S. officials to a country, 
and the number of visits of the country’s leaders to the United States, on bilateral trade flows 
between the country and the United States. In this context, we use variables that indicate the 
number of official visits from 1960-2015 from the historical archives of the U.S. State 
Department. We also use the value of bilateral trade with the United States as a fraction of 
trade with the entire world from the UNCOMTRADE. To deal with potential endogeneity, we 




The estimations provide evidence that the visits by U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of 
State do not have a statistically significant effect on bilateral trade flows, while the leader’s 
trips to the United States have a statistically significant positive effect. This indicates that the 
leader’s trips to the United States are taken as an opportunity to promote free bilateral trade 
flows between the country and the United States, while the visits of American officials focus 
on other issues such as securing loans, asking for assistance, attracting capital, or discussing 
geopolitical factors. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs     Mean     Std. Dev.      Min        Max 
Leaders' trips to U.S.A. 2,101   1.159448   1.915051   0 17 
Trade with U.S.A./Trade with World 1,433   .150019   .1496946   .0008875   1.257079 
Free trade agreements with U.S.A. 2,101   .0994764   .2993719   0 1 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) 1,638   7.388847   11.26248   0 67.66977 
Common language with U.S.A. 2,101   .3089005   .46215   0 1 
Log of GDP per capita 1,698   8.223898   1.486319   5.032804   11.5757 
Population (log) 2,074   15.25498   2.059588   9.263635   21.02894 
Landlock  2,101   .1937173   .395304   0 1 
Capital Distance 2,068   8.973278   .5427634   6.599054   9.702595 
Democracy  1,605   .9680685   7.182261   -10   10 
Visits of the U.S. President 2,101   .2679676   .7138541   0 5 
Visits of the U.S. Secretary of State 2,101   1.107568   2.536748   0 25 
British colony 2,101   .3141361   .4642814   0 1 
French colony 2,101   .1623037   .4218183   0 1 
Spanish colony 2,101   .1623037   .3688169   0 1 
No colonizer  2,101   .1256545   .3315384   0 1 





Table 2 : Fixed Effects  
 
I II III 












Trips of Leaders to U.S.A. t-1 
  
0.003** 
   
(0.001) 
Log of GDP per capita t-1 -0.014 -0.015* -0.018** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Log of Population t-1 -0.021** -0.021** -0.022** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Total natural resources rents (% of 
GDP) t-1 
0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Democracy t-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Common language with US -0.025 -0.024 -0.021 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Common border with US 0.311*** 0.305*** 0.305*** 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
Free trade agreements with US 0.120*** 0.116*** 0.105*** 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Lof of Capital Distance  -0.135*** -0.138*** -0.143*** 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Landlock  0.080*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
No colonizer -0.019* -0.019* -0.021** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
British colony -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
French colony 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Spanish colony 0.127*** 0.129*** 0.132*** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Constant  1.707*** 1.742*** 1.827*** 
 
(0.198) (0.199) (0.192) 
Number of observations 964 964 964 
R2 0.874 0.874 0.875 
Countries effect Yes Yes Yes 
note: .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; Fixed effects OLS estimations with robust 
standard errors clustered by country in parentheses 
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Table 3 : Fixed Effects before and after the end of the Cold War era 
 
I II III IV V VI 
 Post Cold War Cold War 









Visits of the U.S. Secretary of 


















Log of GDP per capita t-1 -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043*** 0.008 0.007 0.006 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024) 
Log Population t-1 -0.097*** -0.097*** -0.101*** 0.021 0.021 0.016 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Total natural resources rents (% 
of GDP) t-1 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Democracy t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Common language with US 0.099*** 0.098*** 0.103*** 0.033 0.033 0.029 
 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.072) (0.074) (0.071) 
Common border with US 0.464*** 0.462*** 0.459*** 0.120 0.126 0.138 
 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.084) (0.086) (0.086) 
Free trade agreements with US 0.038 0.038 0.028 0.017 0.013 0.005 
 
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.024) (0.025) (0.022) 
Log of Capital Distance  -0.155*** -0.156*** -0.156*** -0.135*** -0.138*** -0.139*** 
 
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Landlock  -0.095** -0.096** -0.097** -0.064 -0.065 -0.063 
 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.130) (0.132) (0.128) 
No colonizer -0.079*** -0.079*** -0.077*** -0.120** -0.124** -0.133** 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) 
British colony -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.026 -0.027 -0.030 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
French colony 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.118*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 
 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Spanish colony 0.163*** 0.162*** 0.165*** -0.059 -0.060 -0.055 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.076) (0.077) (0.076) 
Constant  3.395*** 3.407*** 3.468*** 0.986 1.028 1.129* 
 
(0.469) (0.458) (0.461) (0.627) (0.635) (0.637) 
Number of observations 623 623 623 341 341 341 
R2 0.879 0.879 0.879 0.947 0.947 0.948 
Countries effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Table 4. Additional Control Variables 
 
I II III 





Visits of the U.S. Secretary of 






Leaders Trips to U.S.A t-1 
  
0.003** 
   
(0.001) 
Relative Factor Endowments -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
GDP Growth  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Countries effect Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.369*** 1.397*** 1.474*** 
 
(0.210) (0.207) (0.206) 
Number of observations 887 887 887 
R2 0.869 0.869 0.870 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; Fixed effects OLS estimations with robust 







Table 5. Tobit, PML and PPML  
 
Tobit  Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PML)  
Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood 
(PPML)  
 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 










(0.056)   
Visits of the U.S. Secretary of 











 (0.016)  




0.009   0.002 
   
(0.002) 
  
(0.015)   (0.018) 
Log of GDP per capita t-1 -0.019* -0.018* -0.020* -0.110* -0.108* -0.113* -0.070* -0.066* -0.074** 
 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.066) (0.065) (0.067) (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) 
Log Population t-1 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.069 -0.059 -0.079 0.095*** 0.097*** 0.092*** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.100) (0.102) (0.105) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) 
Total natural resources rents (% 
of GDP) t-1 
0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Democracy t-1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.004 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Common language with US -0.113** -0.114** -0.111** -1.610*** -1.624*** -1.580*** -0.373*** -0.376*** -0.373*** 
 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.336) (0.338) (0.346) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) 
Common border with US 0.254*** 0.257*** 0.254*** 3.612*** 3.642*** 3.571*** 0.551* 0.538* 0.526* 
 
(0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.394) (0.389) (0.393) (0.320) (0.302) (0.301) 
Free trade agreements with US 1.122** 1.128** 1.103** 17.302*** 17.532*** 16.958*** 0.154 0.159 0.150 
 
(0.497) (0.498) (0.500) (3.713) (3.754) (3.847) (0.102) (0.104) (0.109) 
Log of Capital Distance  0.902** 0.906** 0.891** 13.937*** 14.097*** 13.701*** -0.077 -0.076 -0.078 
 
(0.368) (0.368) (0.370) (2.738) (2.766) (2.828) (0.091) (0.090) (0.091) 
Landlock  -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.063*** -0.788*** -0.779*** -0.804*** 0.013 0.011 0.013 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.159) (0.160) (0.165) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) 
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No colonizer 0.385** 0.388** 0.379** 6.033*** 6.123*** 5.911*** -0.086 -0.085 -0.090 
 
(0.186) (0.187) (0.187) (1.390) (1.405) (1.438) (0.121) (0.121) (0.122) 
British colony 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.395*** 0.404*** 0.387*** -0.135 -0.134 -0.135 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.130) (0.132) (0.132) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) 
French colony -0.014 -0.013 -0.012 -0.595** -0.606*** -0.574** -0.407*** -0.409*** -0.407*** 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.231) (0.234) (0.240) (0.118) (0.119) (0.118) 
Spanish colony -0.126*** -0.126*** -0.125*** -1.894*** -1.883*** -1.894*** -0.017 -0.024 -0.015 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.125) (0.127) (0.127) (0.119) (0.121) (0.120) 
Countries effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    
Number of observations 1 104 1 104 1 104 1 104 1 104 1 104    
uncensored observations 920.000 920.000 920.000 
   
   
left-censored observations  184.000 184.000 184.000 
   
   





Table 6: Dynamic GMM  
 
I II III 
Trade t-1 0.287*** 0.287*** 0.285*** 
 
(0.066) (0.067) (0.067) 





Visits of the U.S. Secretary of 






Leaders Trips to U.S. t-1 
  
0.006** 
   
(0.003) 
Log of GDP per capita t-1 -0.013 -0.012 -0.009 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Log Population t-1 0.029 0.035* 0.030 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
Total natural resources rents (% 
of GDP) t-1 
0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Democracy t-1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Time  -0.004 -0.005 -0.006* 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
AR(2) test 0.015 0.018 0.020 
Hansen J test 0.011 0.021 0.007 
Number of observations 721 721 721 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 




Table 7: Systems GMM 
 
I II III 
Trade t-1 0.536*** 0.539*** 0.534*** 
 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.041) 





Visits of the U.S. Secretary of 






Leaders Trips to U.S. t-1 
  
0.006* 
   
(0.003) 
Log of GDP per capita t-1 -0.005 -0.008** -0.010*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Log Population t-1 0.003 -0.000 -0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Total natural resources rents (% 
of GDP) t-1 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Democracy t-1 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Common language with US 0.007 0.009 0.011* 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Common border with US 0.186*** 0.146*** 0.141*** 
 
(0.036) (0.024) (0.024) 
Free trade agreements with US 0.012 0.013 0.006 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Log of Capital Distance  -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.047*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Landlock  -0.119*** -0.103*** -0.091*** 
 
(0.034) (0.031) (0.031) 
No colonizer -0.010 -0.015** -0.019*** 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
British colony 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
French colony 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Spanish colony 0.013 0.017** 0.022*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Time  -0.002** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.503*** 0.570*** 0.616*** 
 
(0.086) (0.082) (0.073) 
Number of observations 885 885 885 
AR(2) test 0.001 0.002 0.002 
Sargan test 0.000 0.000 0.000 
note: .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
    
 
